Hamdullah Mohib, Former National Security Advisor of Afghanistan

 Hamdellah Muhib Complete Interview With Arab News TV.

Hamdullah Mohib, Former National Security Advisor of Afghanistan

Hello, and welcome to "Frankly Speaking,"

 where we dive deep into regional headlines and speak with leading policymakers and business leaders.

 I am Katie Jensen. Now, it's more than a year after the Taliban retook power in Afghanistan following a controversial deal with the US, the same country which led a coalition to overthrow them more than 20 years ago. 

Today, the country is in economic and social disrepair, not to mention an alarming return to extremism. On today's show, we speak with Dr. Hamdullah Mohib, former national security advisor to now exiled Afghani President Ashraf Ghani, to ask exactly who is responsible for the fall of Kabul, whether global leaders should recognize the Taliban as a legitimate government and what the future holds for this troubled nation. 

Dr. Hamdullah Mohib, thank you for joining us on "Frankly Speaking." Well, here we are today, more than 20 years since the US mobilized a global coalition to topple the Taliban, and just over a year since the Taliban regained power in Afghanistan with America's blessing. Frankly speaking, who do you blame for the plight of the Afghan people? 

I think there is a lot of blame to be shared. Those of us with bigger responsibilities obviously have a bigger share of the blame deal. And the US negotiating directly with the Taliban and excluding the Afghan government meant the Taliban were not in the mood to make any kind of reconciliation at that point. So I think that's where a big share of the blame goes. But we, the Afghan government, our regional allies and neighbors, countries like Qatar, which hosted the negotiations, the peace talks, we are all to blame. I think, and, this past year there has been so much discussion about who is to blame. 

I think what we want to do is to focus on how we can better the situation for the Afghan people now. But I think in order to better future proof what's happening in the years to come, we do need to look at our history in more detail. So when we look at the blame, you know, I guess if you were to distribute blame between the countries, you mentioned the regional countries as well.

 If you are looking at the US, Qatar, Pakistan, as well as your own government, how much blame would you place on both, on each?

 Well, the Pakistani government always denied that there was any presence of Taliban in their country. We knew there was a huge amount of support to the Taliban. They had their families, they were hosted in Pakistan, they mobilized from Pakistan. So there is a big part of blame that goes to Pakistan, and I think they're suffering as a result of their support to the Taliban.

 Now everything we had warned them against is happening. The Taliban support to the Pakistani Taliban and other groups is now materializing as we had anticipated. Countries like Qatar which hosted the negotiations used the Afghan peace process as a leverage, in its own conflict with the GCC countries. So, and our government was so divided - not just the government, the republic by itself, it was taken for granted that we have the freedoms that we had. Okay. 

Well, I want to ask you about the Doha peace talks in a sec, but further, I just want to ask you what you were saying about Pakistan.

 Now, of course, Islamabad has come out for some time and strongly denied that they have supported the Taliban. 

You've previously said in a media interview with Foreign Policy that frankly, the Taliban could not have existed without Pakistan's support. 

I think you previously said they would've been gone within a month without Pakistan.

 So that's clearly something that you still feel remains true today.Even more strongly than before. Why is that? 

Why more strongly now?

 Before, we anticipated all of the support that the Taliban were getting. Since the fall of the republic, the Afghan politicians who have been trying to organize have found that there is nowhere that is open to host them and hospitable to any kind of political activity. And it has become more apparent what that enabling environment means in the neighborhood. 

To be able to launch an insurgency like what the Taliban had. So, we had read about it, we had seen it, you know, being used. But now we are experiencing how important a host country is. Well, when we talk about hosting, I mean, you know, to look at Qatar, certainly one of the smaller GCC states, but one with big global ambitions. Now, the Taliban officially set up an office there in 2013 with America's backing as well. 

What do you think was in it for Qatar to not only set up that office, but play that negotiator role in these talks in Doha? 

Do you feel it's because they really wanted to cement their reputation within the region as that mediator to strengthen ties with the US as well? 

What was in it for them? 

Countries across the world wanted to play the mediator role. This is something that has been an aspiration for many - even European nations to want to do that. And Qatar playing that role meant it had an oversized role for itself in international diplomacy. Negotiation with the Taliban, and US presence in Afghanistan, was the key topic during that period where it had its own tensions with the other GCC countries - the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia. And so, for Qatar to be able to play host to these negotiations meant they had some leverage with the Americans to use for their own sake in this tension that they had in this region. So, certainly strengthened ties with the US gained from these talks and this office, as well, that was set up. 

How much influence do you think Qatar had on the Taliban?

 I think the Taliban played the negotiations well. They played all parties, including the Qataris, the Pakistanis. 

I think they used the Americans, they used all parties well in the negotiations part. And then there was this global effort to try to create this space for the Taliban who had been the pariah for so long. So, they used that space and I think many countries were fooled by it. And then once the Taliban were in power, they never intended to keep the promises. 

And we see that they haven't been able to deliver, or whether willingly not able to deliver or not deliver. We believe that they never had the intention to deliver on any of the promises that they had to the international community and Afghans. So certainly a lot of countries were fooled. 

I imagine you were talking about the US and I think it's an interesting role that they played because, you know, when we consider the US, it's the same administration that delisted the Houthis as a terrorist organization, that removed the Patriot missile batteries from the Kingdom at the same time that the Houthis were directly targeting civilians in the Kingdom. 

You look at the catastrophe that's happened in Libya under the US and the fact that frankly, they didn't move an inch when Crimea was invaded. 

What were you expecting to come out of this with the US? What were your expectations from the Americans?

 The US had a huge investment in Afghanistan. Not just military presence. There was a lot of civilian presence in Afghanistan. The Afghans looked up to American democracy as an example that could be replicated in Afghanistan. Challenging in a tribal community, of course. I think, you know, there is versions and there is the way you implement democracy in people's rights. 

So maybe perhaps that's a different issue of how it's implemented, what model is put in place. But the Afghan people are inherently democratic, our systems, even tribal systems. And traditional culture is pro-consensus.

 So implementing a system that would have the will of the people was absolutely the right way to go.

 But how could the will of the people happen?

 How can you say democracy would've worked in Afghanistan when there was so much corruption? It really seemed like trying to implement an American type of democracy was going to fail from the beginning in somewhere like Afghanistan.

 I think we are comparing apples and oranges. People wanted to have their say. There's a model that they wanted to see in which was justice. And to be able to have a say in the governance of their country - be able to express themselves. And we did. For a long time, Afghanistan had faced conflict. You know, instead of talking to each other at the barrel of the gun, there were negotiations, there were discussions. 

I would much prefer that there is debate over TV dialogue, tense debate inside the Parliament than to be talking to each other at the barrel of the gun. So there was a demand for Afghanistan. 

And the Afghan people still want to see a representative system in which their opinions can be expressed. Whether that model was the right model for it is debatable. I think the end goal still is, and should be, that the Afghans should have their voices heard. Which seems like it is going to be a very long time until that happens. 

I guess when we look at America's failed role in Afghanistan, do you think one of the main problems has been that America tends to embrace regime change, but then not actually plan for the successful implementation of it and potential outcomes? 

I think this is a failure for all of the international community. Because the Afghan people had pinned their hopes on this coalition. We had suffered for so long. Me, I personally believed that, you know, this coalition that is coming who have democratic systems in their own countries, where there is justice, there is rule of law, there is order, will now be replicated in Afghanistan. And I think, as the international community, not being able to do that cohesively and having failed, means that we all, peace-loving people failed at doing what was necessary to be able to implement. And I think, you know, it's also a lesson in nation building. 

How do we put systems in place that can successfully deliver the needs of the people?

 Now, yes, the Afghan government collapsed. That doesn't mean that some of the achievements of the past have been completely washed. It does feel like it's been wiped out, though. 

More than two decades of achievement seem to have been wiped out in a year. Just the physical picture of Afghanistan, you would see tremendous change physically. I mean just the amount of facilities that have been built over the last 20 years. 

I'm going to disagree with you though, because 95 percent of the population today in Afghanistan are now living below the poverty line. The World Bank says Afghanistan is now the poorest country in the world. Girls are now refused the right to go to school. 

Women refused the right to go to work. And I know I'm telling you nothing new here, but the UN has said this is the fastest growing humanitarian crisis we've seen in recent years. 

I think there is no denying that all of the achievements of the past two decades have been wiped out - when Kabul collapsed, when you and your colleagues chose to flee the country, what hope was there for 40 million Afghans who had no choice to be able to escape via helicopter? 

I think there are two discussions here. One is, you know, was the investment in Afghanistan a total waste? And, it's a different discussion to what is happening right now. I agree with you that the situation in Afghanistan is dire right now. And, we all owe our responsibility to that situation, and we must do everything we can to change that. That's an undeniable fact. 

When it comes to the investment in education, the investment in Afghan society, the reason you see so many voices outside and are able to articulate what they want, is an achievement of that investment. People are more worldly. They have seen what is possible, and they know they have rights. Even if there is an oppressive regime trying to silence their voices, they know they have a voice.

 We see brave women still protesting. We see Afghans, even if they're in the diaspora, voicing their concerns about what is happening in Afghanistan. There is a more collective - there is more effort to try to address the situation in the country.

 Even though, again, like I said, we have a system, an oppressive regime that was brought to power by an international coalition. And there was so much propaganda around the Taliban. Okay. Well, let's talk about some of that propaganda, actually, because I find that really interesting. 

I know you've said previously in a BBC interview, you said the international community where the Taliban began to regain some power again, it really seemed like the international community were enchanted with the Taliban. They really felt like they had changed. I remember the first news conference they held in Kabul, they said they promised rights for women, they promised freedom of the press, they promised an amnesty for government officials. And a year later, we can see that was just lip service. 

So what advice would you give the international community today about the Taliban? 

At the time we made a lot of noises that were unheard. One of them was don't legitimize the Taliban in the way that was happening, and delegitimize the government - that it would take away the fighting power from the republic to defend itself. And if the aim is withdrawal of troops, that can be facilitated in other means. But that is in the past. 

I think what we ought to do now is look at the Taliban from two perspectives. There is the Taliban the regime. Separate that from the Taliban as the people, as those that are in government. Now, the regime is going to have the policies that it has, and we believed then that it is not going to change. It will probably get worse, but not better. And it believes, the regime as a whole thinks - its leader thinks that they have a victory against all of NATO. 

And it believes in the mission that it has. So it will never change anything. But then there are people in the Taliban who had seen those who negotiated in Doha. There are other people among the Taliban that wish to see collaboration and compromise with the international community.

 And I think it's important to focus on what is possible. They - some of those Taliban I know believe that the regime as it is will not stand for long. 

Now, where do we go from there? 

Do we take a part that will then go to a civil war once this regime collapses? Or a part in which they could be a government that is representative of the Afghans will be in place and have a transition that is smoother, without major losses to the Afghan people.

 Well, certainly one of the big concerns under the Taliban is the rights of women. And that's a particularly topical issue considering what's taking place in Iran today. So what are your thoughts on the protests in Iran? 

Do you think we could see a spillover effect in Afghanistan? 

You know, particularly when we are looking at the rights of women under oppression? 

I think with every passing day, the Afghan people's frustration is growing with the Taliban's oppression. The danger here is even more than I think in Iran, because the Afghan people have changed, have seen many changes in regimes, and know it can happen. Do you think that's likely to happen then as a result of the protests we're seeing in Iran? Not as a result - 

I mean, there will definitely be some influence, but I don't know if it will be right now that time where the frustration boils over for mass mobilization in Afghanistan. But if this situation continues, this oppression of the Afghan people continues, I'm certain that there will be mass mobilization in the country. It's just a matter of when it will be.

 I mean, you played such an essential role in Afghanistan's government. You were essentially head of the "three-man republic" for around seven years. 

So with that in mind, as a national security advisor, with all due respect, do you feel that you should be taking personal responsibility for the fall of Afghanistan more than anyone else, given you were one of the main people to stop the coup that was forming under your nose?

 Well, I think first of all, the propaganda that says that they were limiting the republic - the republic cannot be defined in a manner. We had a Parliament, we had media, the republic had the whole specter of what it could offer. And a lot of corruption. Of course, it was at every level. And, you know, I think people who used such propaganda at the time underestimated where they played a role, and how that by itself was weakening what we had. . 

So it was them, not you, you would say? No, it's all of us. I started off by saying that we are all to blame. Right? 

And myself included, I obviously spent a lot of time, and have this past year, reflecting on what could have been done that would've been different. 

What would you have done differently? Well, I think in our own circumstances, situation, this political lack of cohesion was a big, big problem. And whose fault was that, though? 

Does that come from the leadership, or whose fault is that? Is it America's fault again, trying to instill democracy that had never existed successfully in Afghanistan before? No, I think the problem is that most leaders in Afghanistan, whether in government or outside of government, did not anticipate what would happen. I think everybody tried to do their best, but the directions were so different. There was never cohesion. But as national security advisor, is that your job to predict what is likely to happen, in your expertise? Well, no. I think it's all of us. The leadership - there is a responsibility as a job to offer. 

I think there is a lot of focus on what one individual can deliver. No individual in the republic can. This is not a dictatorship. It's not the Taliban's government in which Haibatullah can decide. The republic had all of its glory or problems that we can point to. And so we were all to blame. I take my share of that, and I feel we could have done a better job. 

Could we have prevented the Taliban takeover? 

I still believe we couldn't have once the negotiations began, and the decision by the chief negotiator was to engage the Taliban directly behind the government's back and have secret annexes in the negotiations that the government and the Afghan people are still not aware of. And once that was, the Taliban had more leverage than the Afghan government did. They knew what they had - they knew what they were going to wait for. They were given more leverage and more control over the process than what the republic had. So you feel, essentially, it feels like you're saying the US essentially signed your execution order.

 That once that had started, it was too late to stop? 

Unfortunately, yes. I think all of us expected better from this process, and it could have been handled differently. So it is the case that what happened is the past, but we must learn from that process and see what we can do to better the situation for our people now.

 Well, let's talk about what's happening today, because these days, you and former President Ghani are living in the UAE in exile, unlike 40 million Afghan people who are living under the rule of the Taliban. Do you think that's fair? Because when we look at something like Ukrainian President Zelensky, he chose to stay and fight and defend his country. Why didn't you? I commend what Zelensky is doing. Afghanistan had that kind of a moment where we needed to stand. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, my family included, we fought the Soviet Union for 10 years and lost a million Afghans as a result. And then, as a leader, you make decisions based on what happens and what is best for your people. There was a moment to stay, and then there is a moment to leave. And yes, it's not a popular decision among some of our allies who would've expected a different outcome right now. But once the emotions are cleared in 10 years down the line, or 20, when people can reflect back without emotions included, I think people will start to see why a decision like that was made. It is for the best, it was for the best of our people, we had to protect property. We had to protect public property, private property. We had to protect our people from more chaos and also the dignity of our government in a country when the president needed to be protected by itself. And I think those were the decisions made. And so its impact was in the circumstances the best. We didn't have a good choice to choose from. This was one of the options available which would deliver the best out of the worst scenarios that were presented to us. There is a time to stay and there is a time to leave. And this was a time to leave.

 OK. So what does the future hold for you? Are you planning to remain in politics? 

Are you planning to change domains completely? Do you think you'll stay in exile along with President Ghani, or can you see yourself forming a coalition and, you know, potentially returning to Afghanistan one day? 

I think politics should be separated from a job, from the job. Is that possible? Absolutely. I think roles in politics are not just about the responsibility of the chair that you hold, whether it's the job of the advisor or the president. We were in politics before that, and we are going to be in politics after that. And this is more of a responsibility that is to better our people. 

We have to continue to do what we can do to address the situation. We are not happy with what's happening in Afghanistan. I am not happy with what's happening in Afghanistan. And I feel my responsibility toward my country and my people has not ended with the job or with the republic. We lost the republic. We haven't lost our country. So the country's still there. 

You pointed out that there are still 40 million people in that country who are living under the Taliban. Now, some would agree with what the Taliban are doing. There are obviously a large number of people that do not and their voices must be heard, and they must feel at home in their own country and should not be felt like they have to live in exile. It's the hardest thing for me to do to not be in my country. 

So you can see yourself returning there? 

The moment the situation allows it. And we have the opportunity, I will be at home. It's the hardest thing to live abroad. I had lived before I chose to go back to Afghanistan because home is where we all feel at our best. 

So how long do you think the Taliban will remain in power for? 

With every passing day I feel like the Taliban's regime, the life of the Taliban's regime is shortening by their own actions. They had a tremendous opportunity when they came to power to create an environment in which reconciliation could truly happen. And there was enough anticipation on the part of the international community. The world was watching. 

The Afghans were watching what the Taliban would do. They went halfway in announcing an amnesty. Now that was a disrespect to everybody who served Afghanistan. Working in the government was not at fault. The Taliban were attacking Afghan people and civilians, and they killed thousands, for what they believed in just because there were other people who believed in another way, did not make them criminals. But nonetheless, the Taliban only applied that amnesty with half-heartedness. And while they gave lip service to it, the Taliban commanders actively persecuted Afghan officials and Afghan security forces.

 And so, also, all of the promises that they had delivered about change in their policies were seen to be reversed. And so with every passing day, that window is shortening. There is still a chance that the Taliban could commit to reconciliation in which all the Afghans could see themselves in a representative system. 

But if this kind of oppression continues, I feel like we will see an end to the Taliban regime as it stands now, not too far away from now. Well, certainly a very uncertain future remains for the Afghan people.

 Dr. Hamdullah Mohib, thank you very much for joining us today on "Frankly Speaking." 

We appreciate your time. Thank you. We have had a difficult past, a lot of uncertainty in our past, but we look forward to a settled future for Afghanistan. Inshallah