Sa'dullah Khan (Sa'd Allah Khan) known as 'Sartor Faqir ' was member of a honourable family of Buner.
He is also known as Mullah (Mulla) Sartor Baba Faqir Baba, to the British as the 'Mad Mullah and mad Faqir. By birth he was the son of a Bunerwal Malik Hameedullah and an inhabitant of village Rega Buner. He belonged to the Abazai, a branch of the Nuriza'i which is a sub-branch of the Yusufzai Malizai.
Details about his early life are sketchy. It is said that he was a great wrestler and an athlete in his youth From childhood he took up travelling to various areas in search of religious education and for a period stayed also in Ajmir (India)But according to McMahon and Ramsay "owing to a quarrel with his brother in which he is said to have killed him (some say accidentally) he hurriedly left Buner and went to India. He lived for some years in Ajmir and other places in India."10 He further travelled to Central Asia and eventually settled in Mazar-i-Sharif, the Amir's Chief Cantonment in Afghan Turkistan. He is said to have lived there for ten years and then to have gone to Kabul. He returned to Buner in 1895 where he had tried to stir up a Jihad, but, without success.
Nevertheless, his piety soon made him widely known in the Swat and Indus Kohistan, and his religious fervour earned him his title of Mastan. To his single-mindedness of purpose, impatience of political intrigue, and to his fanaticism against the British Government his name of Mullah Mastan (mad Mullah) is due. Woosnam Mills compares hint to Peter the Hermit in perseverance and assiduity which are the characteristics of the frontier fanatics. He is said to 'have liberally spread his doctrines of murder and rapine amongst the tribesmen'17 against the British forces and their allies and supporters.
In the summer of 1897 the Sartor Faqir visited Bajour, the Uthman Khel country, and Buner, preaching the necessity of waging war against all enemies of the Faith. He is supposed to have been in league with Hajab-ud-din (Hajab al-Din), the notorious (from British point of view) Mullah of Hadda, whose fanatical hostility to the British Government was well known.18 He appeared in Upper Swat in July (1897) and the fame of his preaching spread far and wide.
Impatient at the failure of the other leaders to start Jihad, the Sartor Faqir determined to do so himself.Intense emotions were rising against the Imperial Power and "the time was one of great unrest in Swat and elsewhere on the border".
The Faqir took up his abode at Landakai. A folk verse state.
په لنډاکي کښي ورته ناست سرتور فقیر دی
ډینګ فرنګي د ځان په ویر دی
He proclaimed that he had an invisible army from heaven at his side to assist him.He professed to have the power of making himself invisible and feeding multitudes with a few grains of rice. H. Woosnam Mills writes: Further stories stated that he was in possession of a species of widow's cruse from which he fed all his hosts. There is little doubt that by some trickery he managed to impose on many of his subsequent followers, for the tale was told and believed that the Malik of one of the villages sent him a gift of Rs. 50, which was returned with Rs. 50 more in addition and the message that the fakir required no money, as God produced all his requirement.
Among a people so credulous such stories were readily believed. But according to McMahon and Ramsay the Faqir "on first starting was well supplied with funds." May be from Afghanistan and India. The Faqir's travelling to India and Afghanistan and staying there for some years indicate that he may have had contacts with the Indian Mujahideen (followers of Sayyid Ahmad Shahid Breillavi) and with the Amir of Afghanistan.
The Indian contact is evident in the person of his second in-command "who is said to have been a mullah from India"29 and the Afghan factor by the publication of a book on jihad named Targhib-al-jihdd30 by the Amir of Afghanistan. Furthermore it is said that besides supernatural and unseen support he had magical power too.31 About the 20th and 21st (July 1897) the Faqir began giving out that he had heavenly hosts with him, that his mission was to turn the British off the Malakand and out of Peshawar, as their (British) rule of 60 years there was up. He claimed to have been visited by all the deceased faqirs, who told him that the mouths of their (British) guns and rifles would be closed and that their (British troops) bullets would be turned to water; that he had only to throw stones into the Swat river, and each stone the threw would have on them (British troop) the effect of a gun.
Inspite of all the prevailing excitements and developments Sartor Faqir "was regarded by the headmen of the country as a mad man"33 and the Thana Khan Khel headmen, who were consulted on the subject said on the 25th (July 1897) to Major Deane (Political Agent) that no importance need be attached to his proceedings.
The Mianguls also professed to ignore him, and said they would send a servant to remove him.
Nevertheless "the native mind was impressed by the extraordinary stories, and the more improbable they were the wider was the degree of popularity extended to them". He was popularly believed to have vast armies hidden in the hills, which at the proper moment would be launched forth against the Sirkar (sarkar, government). Local people talked of nothing else for days in the Malakand Bazar but of magnificent cavalry, artillery and infantry which were at the holy man's (Sartor Faqir's) disposal, and on one ventured near the hilly neighbourhood where this army lay concealed, strict orders to that effect having, it was stated, been issued by the Faqir himself.
On 26th July 1897 the Sartor Faqir started down the valley from Landakai followed only by a few boys, one of whom he proclaimed King of Delhi. He had raised red crescent standard.
He announced that with or without help from his listeners he would sweep the British troops from Chakdara and the Malakand in eight days. His excited appeals to the fanaticism which exists in every Pathan were responded to in a manner little short of marvellous. The people, amazed at his boldness, and overcome by superstitious fears of his powers, joined him as he proceeded His progress from Landakai to Thana and thence to Aladand, both villages within the views of Chakdara post, must have been a triumphal one; the villagers flew to arms.
British levies hastily retired, except such as joined his standard. All the headmen, with one solitary exception, were carried away by the popular enthusiasm, and by nightfall a resolute body of tribesmen was on the move to attack Malakand while another party turned its attention to Chakdara43. A hurried warning was brought in to Major Deane by a Levy jamedar (jama'dar) who galloped in with the news at 9:15 p.m. that the tribesmen were approaching Malakand.
Due to the aforesaid developments and circumstances, towards the end of July, 1897, the gravity of the situation could no longer be ignored, and it was considered necessary to warn the (British) troops stationed in the neighbourhood to hold themselves in readiness for action at the shortest notice. So the alarm was sounded and the (British) troops had barely time to go for their arms before the attack commenced.46 The Faqir with his followers made a sudden attack on Malakand and Chakdara simultaneously.
He had roused the whole valley, and his standard afterwards became the rallying point for thousands of fighting men from Upper Swat, Buner, the Utmankhel country and even more distant parts.48 The tribesmen who on the first night had barely exceeded 1000 (men), increased in numbers with incredible rapidity to some 12000 or more at Malakand, while upwards of 8000 (men) at Chakdara. For the British on July 26 (1897) the situation assumed so grave an aspect that the Guides were summoned from Mardan before the tribesmen could attack and they arrived at Malakand after their famous march the other day on 27Th July 1897, By 28th the mobilisation of the troops in India was ordered and some of them were even then on their way.
On the 30th July the 35th Sikhs and 38th Dogras arrived,52 and "the 31st was marked by the arrival of more troop." The tribesmen were so confident of their success that they had done no damage to the bridge over the river, and had abstained from firing on the horses and mules within the defensive area, though these had been exposed to fire throughout.
In the actual contest "the Fakir who, to do him justice, showed himself a brave man, was severely wounded in the hand" and lost his right-hand forefinger.56 His second- in-command and companion, a Mullah from India was killed. Heavy fighting continued at both places, until Malakand was relieved on August 1st and Chakdara on the 2nd. The Mad Mulla and his warriors disappeared as quickly and as strangely as they had come, leaving behind them several hundred of their own and British dead. The attempt of Sartor Faqir, to oust the English from Malakand and Chakdara, was not foiled simply by the gallantry, dauntless courage or bravery of the Imperial forces as H. Woosman Mills use these words time and again in their respect The failure of the jihad was inter-alia due to the absence of pre-planning for a long drawn war, shortage of supplies, the Faqir's false claims of victory before coming in sight of the new moon, no discipline and organization.
in the Faqir's warriors' ranks. Moreover, the Faqir's precipitation of matters, From unacquaintance of the tribesmen with the strategy of a long drawn war and last but not the least on British side it was "a fresh victory of organization over sheer mass power."
Although the Faqir retired from Malakand and his followers dispersed he did not give up his mission. The Political Officer reported that the Mad Mullah' tried to raise
Shanazai (Shamozai) villages north-east of Chakdara on the night of the 5th (August 1837) but failed.64 When the Chitral relief took place in May 1898 the Faqir, thinking the moment a favourable one, tried to get into Dir to make an attack on them, but his messengers were turned back by the tribesmen. In July 1898 "persistent reports" came in that the Faqir was trying to raise another jihad, but the clans in Swat refused to give him passage.
In November 1898 the Swat tribes on the right bank of the Swat river, incensed at various acts of interference in their affairs by the Nawwab of Dir, appealed to the Mad Faqir who crossed the river on the 25th November and espoused their cause against the Nawwab. Numbers flocked to his standard, and he started off to attack Dir and then with the support, as he hoped, of Dir tribes to again attack the Malakand.68 The Faqir advanced on the 30th November, reports McMahon and Ramsay, to the crest of the watershed of the Panjkora river at the head of the Nikbi Khel (Nikpi Khel) valley, and another march would have brought him into the road between Chakdara and Dir.
The immediate effect of this would have been to bring the Dir tribes to his side, and the English could have had to face another general rising like that of 1897. The moment was a critical one. (However), for some unknown reason the Faqir delayed an immediate advance.
Due to the Faqir's delay and hesitation of the Nawwab of Dir to move against him Abdullah Khan ('Abd Allah Khan) of Robat with some 1200 men advanced over the hills and attacked the Fakir's forces, who retreated towards the Swat River.
This changed in a moment the whole aspect of the war, and instead of a general jihad against the infidel, the affair became one of Muhammadan against Muhammadan, and not only committed the Dir tribes concerned against the Faqir, but dispelled the belief that no tribesman would dare to oppose him.
This unexpected opposition by the Dir tribes under 'Abdullah Khan of Robat upset his (the Faqir's) plan, and the presence of a moveable column in the Swat valley and their movement up the valley (to Haibatgram near Landakai) forced him to abandon the attempt and again retire to Kohistan.
To prevent the Faqir's further attempts, agreements were executed between the Nawwab of Dir, the tribes on the right bank of river Swat and the British Government. The tribes of Shamizai, Sebujni, Nikpi Khel and Shamozai promised never again to allow the Faqir or other enemy of the Nawwab or Government to enter their country.
The government entered into understanding and agreements with other tribes on the left bank of river Swat and the 'Mianguls to counter the Faqir's influence and block his way of further rousing the masses.
Thus by adopting the policy of 'divide and rule' the British Government constrained the Faqir to make terms with it. So, in 1900 AD. he made friendly advances to the Political Agent of Malakand, through one of his leading adherents. These advances were received in a friendly spirit, and the Faqir volunteered the promise that he would abstain from any further acts of hostility to the British Government.
The British Government claimed the Faqir's grand son Humayun, offered him the Nawwabi (ruler ship) of Swat but he rejected.
Any how according to McMahon and Ramsay, the exchange of messages and presents between him and the Political Agent became widely known in the country, and the result had naturally been that the Faqir's influence had visibly declined. He and his principal adherents were accused of being in receipt of Government pay, and their denials were not believed by those who claimed a share in his profits. It was hard to say whether the Faqir had been more discredited by the unfounded belief in his receiving Government pay, or by his persistence denials of it.
Nevertheless, he did not remain hidden, underground and nor did practically gave up his mission. But some years later, the Sartor Faqir, induced by Afghans, prepared for another raid — on 9th May 1908 Gul Shahzada Miangul (who of late years had become very friendly and even received the Political Agent as a guest in his sanctuary at Saidu) sent word that he had "heard that the Faqir had reached Azzi Khel country with his lashkars and expressed his willingness to do anything that was required in the matter.
Swat was of course instantly alive with excitement. However, he next departed northwards, sending, as a parthian shot at Gul Shahzada, a sealed letter to the Political Agent stating that he had been forbiden to go on by Naqshband Khan, and that it was for his sake and not the MianguTs that he had given up his plans.
The Political Agent records in his diary that the Faqir "severely beat a messenger of Gul Shahzada Miangul Wadood, it seems possible that more will be heard of it, because the last claim which the Minagul's best friends make for them would be that they have forgiving tempers." However, his advancing age was against him and the Faqir, already an old man at the turn of the century, saw his following break up after the failure of the movement and as a result of his incapacity to live up to his magical exploits and exaggerated promises. Besides his attempts against the Imperial power, Sartor Faqir went from place to place and after the unsuccessful attempt of 1897 heTeturneti to the Indus" Kohistan and lived for some time at Miandam near Paitai (Now Fatehpur). Later on he settled, permanently, in Paitai and married the daughter of Abdur Rahim ('Abd al-Rahim).
Wherever he went, claims Habib-ur-Rahman and Humayun, land and daughters were bestowed on him by the people. When he left the place he left the wife with the land and children (if any) there. His other marriages were before his permanent settlement at Fatehpur.
The last Wali of Swat, Miangul Jahanzeb, states that "he was just that: a mad Mullah. He had no descendants, he had no tribe." It seems that the last Wali of Swat has tried to distort facts about the Sartor Faqir. About his madness McMahon and Ramsay admit that "the Fakir so far from mad was a man of some acuteness." About his descendants Roshan Khan writes that he left behind four daughters and a four years' son named 'Umara Khan (died in 1988).
Apart from his descendants in Fatehpur (Swat) he had four sons, Azad "Khan, 'Abdullah ('Abd Allah), Muhibullah (Muhib Allah) and Mir Afdal, in village Rega (Buner). Azad Khan migrated to Swat and settled in Satal near Bahrain. 'Abdullah died in the Faqir's lifetime and the other two remained in Riga. He had another son Amir Faqir in Kanra (Ghwarband) and a daughter Bacha Zarina in Besham. As far as his tribe is concerned, he belonged to Abazai, a branch of Nurizai which is a sub-branch of Yusufzai Malizai. Further more he was not a commoner but "the son of a Bunerwal Malik."
In response to some queries Habib-ur-Rahman of Fatehpur (Swat) told that the Faqir used to receive sacks of rupees, from Dir and Afghanistan, as shukranay (lit. gratitudes) from his adherents; but he used to distribute these to the needful, the poor and thse youth.
His household people were in receipt of these shukranay in his absence. He used to feed his visitors. He did not care for khans and maliks but occupied himself with the masses, preached them not to shoot and kill each other. He died as an octogenarian in 1336 A.H. (1917 A.D.) in Fatehpur and was buried there.
It may be concluded that the main task, mission and objective of the Sartor Faqir was to wage jihads and eliminate the British Imperialists from the North Western Frontier region of India. He made several attempts but failed mainly due to his precipitation of matters and unplanned acts, his own old age, the British agreements and
arrangements with the various tribes, khans and Nawwab of Dir, and their supremacy in arms, ammunition, communication system and trained and regular disciplined army and also due to "the changed attitude of the British to the Miangul (Abdul Wadood) and his strategy."
Nevertheless McMahon and Ramsay admit that "the Sartor Fakir provided some of the hardest and sternest fighting we have known on the North-Western fFrontiers." It may be said that his movement kept the urge for freedom and jihad alive among the hardy warriors of this region.
Research Paper about Sartor Faqir Mula
THE SARTOR FAQIR
LIFE AND STRUGGLE
AGAINST
BRITISH IMPERIALISM
By Sultan E Room.
Comments
Post a Comment
Thanks for visiting Pashto Times. Hope you visit us again and share our articles on social media with your friends.